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Abstract
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs),
which coordinate delivery for over two-thirds of the
electricity consumed in the U.S., are required by the
FERC to employ stakeholder-driven mechanisms to
establish market and operational rules. These
“governance structures” set up a quasi-political
process for determining which market rules are adopted
and which are not. This study shows how governance
systems are not simply administrative constructs but
have real impacts – the details of how the market rules
are made will ultimately affect market outcomes. Using
the capacity market in the PJM Interconnection as a
case study, we model the preferences of individual
stakeholders over different capacity market designs,
under different decision rules for which capacity market
design is implemented. We compare capacity market
design choices under PJM’s current decision system,
which requires a super-majority in a sector-weighted
voting context to implement a new market rule, with the
decision systems used in the New York ISO and also
under systems of preferential voting. This voting model
is integrated with a model of capacity market clearing
which allows us to demonstrate how different decision
systems matter in terms of installed capacity and
capacity market outcomes.

1. Introduction
This study aims to show how the governance of
regional transmission organizations (RTOs) is not just
an administrative system but has a measurable impact
on the electricity market. Our definition of
“governance” primarily includes the administrative
processes that each RTO has for establishing market and
operational rules. The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) requires RTOs to include some
level of stakeholder engagement in establishing market
and operational rules, but the mechanisms for
stakeholder engagement vary widely by RTO [1]. The
RTOs serving New England, New York and the MidAtlantic region confer substantial influence on
stakeholders, who vote on whether specific rule changes
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should be filed with FERC. Other RTOs use
stakeholders in a more advisory capacity. The definition
of a “stakeholder” varies between RTOs – in the context
of this paper (as in [2-4]) market participants are
considered stakeholders, but other interested parties
such as environmental groups and state regulators are
not considered stakeholders. We explore different
governance systems, especially voting rules, and show
how different voting rules change market outcomes
which can be presented in dollar terms.
The potential connection between RTO governance
and market performance was first raised by Dworkin
and Goldwasser [5] but has received more attention in
the past few years [6-9]. We add to this growing
literature on RTO governance by providing more direct
and quantitative evidence of a relationship between
RTO governance and market outcomes. As a specific
case study, we explore different decision mechanisms
that could be applied to the PJM voting system and show
how these differences could change market outcomes in
PJM’s capacity market.
Previous work focusing on decision mechanisms in
the PJM stakeholder process [2-4] showed that under the
current voting system in PJM (which requires a
supermajority in the context of sector-weighted voting,
as described further in Section 2), stakeholders in PJM
would have great deal of difficulty passing any proposal
for capacity market reform. A strong coalition of endusers could prevent the passage of any market rule
change that would tend to increase capacity prices.
Existing analyses have also found that a small number
of swing voters preventing passage of market rule
changes that would tend to decrease capacity prices.
Results from prior work raise the question of the
importance of the specific voting structure in which
market rule proposals pass or fail. In addressing this
question, we focus on two mechanisms for changing
RTO decision systems: elimination of the supermajority
requirement for voting and the use of preferential voting
in which voters rank options in an order of their
preference. Our approach builds a joint model of the
stakeholder process by which the capacity market rules
are established that is integrated with a model of
capacity market clearing. We use this model to simulate
voting outcomes under different decision systems, and
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then use the capacity market model to estimate the
market implications of those systems.
The modeling approach described and implemented
in this paper is able to connect the process of making
decisions on market rules with outcomes in those
markets. The importance of this has been suggested in
the existing literature on RTO governance [2-5] but has
not previously been implemented. This work also adds
to the literature on interactions between individual and
group preferences and outcomes in the power grid and
electricity markets [10]. Our approach involves four
steps.
1. Develop a candidate set of market rule revisions.
2. Model preferences of RTO stakeholders over these
candidate market revisions. In this paper we use the
method from [4], with a modification to handle
cases where preferences may be ambiguous.
3. Model the voting outcome under different decision
systems to determine which market rule is adopted.
4. Model the implementation of the adopted market
rule and compare those modeled outcomes to actual
outcomes (if historical data is available) or
outcomes that would have prevailed under a
different market rule.
We illustrate this approach using PJM’s stakeholder
process and capacity market. We model the preferences
of each stakeholder in PJM over different parameters of
the Variable Resource Requirement (VRR) curve,
which is used as the demand curve in capacity market
clearing. An actual set of proposed VRR curve reforms
from 2011 is used as our set of candidate market rules.
Based on these preferences, we model the prevailing
VRR curve under different voting passage thresholds
than PJM currently uses, and also under three different
preferential voting models. In the case of the PJM
capacity market, we find that either lowering the voting
passage threshold or the use of a preferential voting
mechanism enhances the political power of end-use
customers in PJM and would lead to capacity market
rules that would lower prices but also lower the level of
installed capacity. The magnitude of the market impact
of these different voting rules is highly sensitive to
several market parameters, but the voting mechanism
itself clearly has an impact.
In section 2, we explain the current voting rules of
PJM and introduce alternative voting rules that we
consider in this study. Section 3 shows how we modeled
supply and demand curve in the capacity market to
connect voting outcomes and market outcomes. Section
4 illustrates how we identified preference order and
describes simulation results of expected voting outcome
(and so the market outcome) under different voting
rules. Section 5 offers some concluding thoughts and
directions for future research.

2. Modeling RTO Decision Systems
This section introduces the different voting rules
considered in this paper, as follows:
• PJM’s current voting system, which uses sector
weighted voting with a supermajority required for
passage of a rule change;
• The voting system used in the New York ISO,
which is similar to PJM but with different sector
weights and a different passage threshold;
• Three preferential voting procedures: Instant
Runoff Voting, Coombs Rule and Borda Count.
Preferential voting systems all require voters to express
preferences over different alternatives, rather than
asking them to choose one alternative. While there are
drawbacks [11-13], proponents of the preferential
voting system argue that it is less vulnerable to strategic
voting, and it ensures winners to get majority when there
are more than two alternatives [14-16]. Given the
difficulties in passing capacity market reforms in PJM
through its existing stakeholder process, preferential
voting models are of particular interest.

2.1. PJM’s Voting Rule
This section contains an abbreviated description of
stakeholder voting in PJM; for a more detailed
description, [2] or [4]. Each stakeholder in PJM must
assign itself to one of five industry sectors: Generation
Owners (GO), Transmission Owners (TO), Electric
Distributors (ED), End-Use Customers (EUC), and
Other Suppliers (OS). Compared to the other sectors that
have reasonably intuitive definitions, the OS sector is
very heterogeneous, including Curtailment Service
Providers (or demand response aggregators), Muni/coop utilities, and Financial market players such as hedge
funds. Figure 1 shows shares of sectors among 530
voting members in the PJM as of February 2019.

Figure 1: PJM stakeholders by sector
Each stakeholder can cast one vote per proposed
alternative – yes, no, or abstain – and a proposed
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alternative is adopted if it receives two-thirds majority
votes. PJM implements sector-weighted voting that
gives equal weight to all five sectors. As a result, each
sector gets 20% of the total voting score, and each
sector’s voting score represents a share of favoring votes
of that sector excluding abstention votes. In other words,
individual voters within the same sector share the one
score and are inversely weighted by the number of
voters of its sector. If the total voting score, or the sum
of those score contributions, exceeds the threshold, then
a voting issue would pass. The final voting score V is
defined as:
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In (1), 𝛿,% is an indicator variable equal to one if a voter
i in sector k votes yes and zero if the voter votes no. 𝑛%
is the total number of voters in sector k, and 𝑎% is the
number of abstention votes in sector k. A voting item
passes if its final voting score V is greater than 3.335.
This implies that any two sectors could jointly prevent
passage regardless of the number of voters in those
sectors or the votes in other sectors.
Prior work [2-4] describes how this voting system
has contributed to difficulties in capacity market reform
in PJM. These difficulties are illustrated in Table 1,
which shows the calculation of the voting score V for six
different VRR curve proposals considered in 2011. All
six failed (including the option to make no changes to
the VRR curve). The proposals themselves are shown
visually in Figure 2. As [2,4] describe, those proposals
that would have increased capacity prices (Packages 1,
10 and 11 in Figure 1) were defeated by the strong enduser coalition. Those proposals that would have
decreased capacity prices (Packages 12 and 13) failed
because of the actions of a small number of swing
voters. After the voting process could not produce a
passable reform to the VRR curve, PJM filed its
preferred option (Package 1 in Figure 2) with FERC.
Other things equal, Package 1 would have produced the
largest increase in capacity prices relative to the status
quo.
Table 1: Capacity market voting outcomes
(Blumsack and Yoo, 2017)
Transmission
Owner
Generation
Owner
End Use
Customer
Electric
Distributor

Status Quo

Package 1

Package 10

Package 11

Package 12

Package 13

0.083

0.8

0.75

0.167

0.167

0.333

0.071

0.833

0.714

0.077

0.231

0.267

0.083

0

0

0.909

1

1

0.043

0

0

0.913

0.913

1

Other Supplier

0.056

0.667

0.323

0.235

0.25

0.513

Voting Score and
Result

0.336
Failed

2.3
Failed

1.787
Failed

2.301
Failed

2.561
Failed

3.113
Failed

Figure 2: VRR proposals considered by PJM
stakeholders. Source: Author calculations
based on [17].

2.2. The New York ISO Voting Rule
Similar to PJM, voters in NYISO also have the same
option per proposed voting issue – yes, no and abstain.
There are, however, a few differences in terms of sector
composition and sector weight as shown in Table 2. The
most significant differences for our analysis are that the
sectors are not equally weighted in NYISO (recall that
each sector in PJM gets a 20% weight), and the passage
threshold is 58%, which is lower than the 66.67%
threshold in PJM.
Table 2: Voting structures in PJM and NYISO
PJM
Passage threshold
Sector and
sector weight

66.67%
Generation owners
Other suppliers
Transmission owners
End-Use Consumers
Electric Distributor

NYISO
20%
20%
20%
20%
20%

58%
Generation owners
Other suppliers
Transmission owners
End-Use Consumers
Public Power

21.5%
21.5%
20%
20%
17%

Another difference is that NYISO has a Public
Power sector and not an Electric Distributor sector as
does PJM. There is, however, substantial overlap
between the two sectors in terms of the kinds of
companies falling under each. Our analysis here will
thus treat them as equivalent (in other words, we assume
that a firm in the Electric Distributor sector would be
placed in the Public Power sector if that firm were
located in New York).

2.3. Preference Voting Rules
In addition to the sector-weighted voting rules used
by PJM and NYISO, we also model capacity market
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outcomes under three preference voting models: Instant
runoff voting, the Coombs rule and the Borda count.
Instant runoff voting (IRV) is a preferential voting
procedure with elimination. Voters in IRV rank all
alternatives based on their preference. In the initial
round, the first choices are counted and the winner is the
alternative that gets first-place votes greater than or
equal to a threshold. If no alternative surpasses the
threshold, then the candidate with the fewest number of
first-place votes is eliminated. Those voters whose first
choice was eliminate see their votes distributed among
other alternatives based on their second-place vote. This
process of elimination continues until one alternative
surpasses the threshold. Although IRV is often criticized
for perplexity – it asks voters to specify their full
preference over all alternatives which requires deeper
understandings and thus more time [18], the proponents
of IRV claim that IRV is comparatively resistant to
strategic voting among preferential voting, increases
probability for minority representation, and reduces cost
in case of multiple runoffs are required [19-21].
The Coombs rule is similar to IRV. It requires voters
to rank all alternatives and the procedure of elimination
and transfer of votes continues until a winner is elected.
The difference from IRV is the elimination rule – when
there is no winner, the Coombs rule eliminates the
alternative that receives the largest number of last-place
votes.
The Borda count [22] is a voting procedure that has
been considered extensively in the political science
literature (the literature on this is large, but [23,24] are
examples). Similar to the IRV and the Coombs rule,
voters under the Borda count are required to rank
alternatives in a preference order. If the number of
alternatives is n, the procedure assigns a score of (n-1)
to the first-place alternative, a score of (n-2) to the
second-place alternative, and so forth. The lowestranked alternative receives a score of zero. After
combining scores from all voters, the alternative with
the highest total score wins.

3. Modeling Capacity Markets
3.1. Construction of the capacity market
simulation model
Section 2.1 described the failure of stakeholders in
PJM to approve (by vote) any reforms to the VRR curve
used in PJM’s capacity market. The candidate VRR
curves are shown in Figure 2, and our voting model will
determine which of the VRR curves (if any) is
ultimately adopted. This chosen VRR curve will serve
as our capacity demand curve for capacity market
simulations under alternative stakeholder voting
structures.

PJM does not publish detailed data on the shape of
the capacity offer curve. To estimate this curve, we
employ data from the sensitivity analysis that was
conducted by PJM [25] and from the analysis report of
the market monitor of PJM [26] covering the capacity
market for delivery in 2015/2016. These sensitivity
analyses provide information on what the capacity
market clearing price and quantity would have been
under different scenarios (e.g., more or less supply
offered). For the purposes of this analysis, we do not
consider special products in our capacity supply model,
such as Extended Summer Demand Response. We also
do not model zonal capacity price separation, which
often occurs in PJM. Our estimated supply curve is
shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Simulated PJM capacity offer curve.
The candidate VRR curves are also shown.
We use the results of two scenarios from PJM’s
analysis: the first scenario assumes the annual supply
increases by 6,000 MW from the bottom of the supply
curve, shifting the supply curve to the right; the second
scenario assume the supply decreases by the same
amount, shifting the supply curve to the left.
Information from this sensitivity analysis give us three
actual data points of the original supply curve: the actual
market clearing point (point 4 in Figure 3), the first
scenario’s market clearing price at the clearing capacity
of the base scenario minus 6,000 MW (point 3 in Figure
3), and the second scenario’s market clearing price at the
clearing capacity of the base scenario plus 6,000 MW
(point 5 in Figure 3).
We also used two pieces of information from the
market monitor report [26] to build our capacity offer
curve. According to the report, 77% of the cleared
capacity offered at or below $35/MW-day. Assuming
that the most expensive unit of the 77% offered at
$35/MW-day, the first data point is set at $35/MW-day
and 77% of the cleared capacity (point 3 in figure 3).
The second data point is based on the assumption that
the last (or the most expensive) unit of the cleared
capacity offered at the price cap (point 6 in Figure 3).
The end point of the flat portion (point 1 in Figure 3) is
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arbitrarily set, since in the context of this analysis it does
not affect the clearing price result. Based on the five
identified points, we construct the capacity offer curve
as a piecewise function. The first segment assumes an
offer price of zero (this is a strong assumption but does
not affect our results). The second segment is a linear
function connecting the end of the flat portion,
$35/MW-day offer point (point 2), and then to the first
scenario point (point 3). The third segment is a quadratic
function connecting the two scenario data points (points
3 and 5), the actual market clearing point (point 4), and
the price cap point (point 6).

3.2. Sensitivity of capacity market outcomes
to the chosen VRR curve
The capacity market model described in Section 3.1
allows for a comparative statics analysis to simulate
different market clearing outcomes based on the chosen
VRR curve. These simulated outcomes are shown in
Table 3 and Figure 4.
Table 3: Modeled capacity market outcomes
under different VRR curves
VRR Curve
(Ref. Fig. 2)

Clearing Price
($/MW-day,
UCAP)

Clearing
Quantity
(MW, UCAP)

Total market
payment
($/day)

Status Quo
Package 1
Package 10
Package 11
Package 12
Package 13

128.90
130.64
129.16
128.54
126.42
125.93

164,340
164,470
164,360
164,310
164,140
164,110

21,183,426
21,486,361
21,228,738
21,120,407
20,750,579
20,666,372

% change in
Price
compared to
Status quo

% change in
Quantity
compared to
Status quo

1.35%
0.20%
-0.28%
-1.92%
-2.30%

0.08%
0.01%
-0.02%
-0.12%
-0.14%

Of the VRR curves considered by stakeholders in
PJM, Packages 1 and 10 would have generated higher
clearing prices, other things being equal (1.11% higher
and 0.08% higher than the status quo). The remaining
proposals (Packages 11, 12 and 13) would have lowered
clearing prices relative to the status quo, other things
being equal (0.28% to 2.3% lower than the status quo).
Based on our estimated supply curve, the difference
between Packages 1 and 13 would have amounted to
$256 million in capacity revenue for a single delivery
year, and would have changed the clearing quantity by
1%, relative to the target installed capacity margin.
These outcomes will be sensitive to the shape of the
capacity offer curve around the market clearing point,
which we discuss further in Section 4.

Figure 3: Illustrating the sensitivity of capacity
market outcomes to the chosen VRR curve.

4. The Impact of Voting Rules on
Capacity Market Outcomes
This section describes how the application of
different voting rules in PJM (as described in Section 2)
affect the choice of VRR parameters and thus capacity
market outcomes. We state at the outset that an
important assumption made throughout our analysis is
that the stakeholder’s voting behavior does not change
when voting rule changes and modeling voting behavior
under different voting rules remains as future work.
While lowering the passage threshold (as in NYISO) is
relatively clear in application, modeling preferential
voting requires some care. Preferential voting requires
voters to specify their full preference order without
omitting any proposed alternatives. In the historical data
on VRR curve votes in PJM in 2011, however, there are
a considerable number of abstentions. This means that
some stakeholders in PJM votes yes or no on some of
the VRR curve alternatives but not others. Where voter
preferences are not clear, we use a Monte Carlo
approach to generate simulated voting outcomes. This
allows us to examine whether outcomes under different
voting systems are robust to uncertainty over voter
preferences.

4.1. Modeling voter preferences
Based on prior work [2,4] we develop relative
preference orders over the VRR curve parameter
packages (Figure 2) based on the votes of actual
stakeholders in 2011, which we obtained from PJM
[27]. This data set also contains information on
individual stakeholders (including their industry sector,
line of business and asset holdings) that we can use to
develop a preference order where the voting record may
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be ambiguous. Stakeholders that we identify as
consumers are assumed to prefer lower capacity clearing
prices over higher prices. Their preference would be in
the following order: package 13 (being the favorite for
setting the lowest clearing price), package 12, package
11, status quo, package 10, and package 1 (being the
least favorite for setting the highest clearing price).
Stakeholders that we identify as suppliers would have
the opposite preference order. Following this intuitive
preference order, we assign number one to the favorite
proposal (package 13 for the consumers and package 1
for the suppliers) and six to the least favorite (package 1
for the consumers and package 13 for the suppliers) by
preference types.
As in [2] and [4] the preference modeling approach
that we employ does have some limitations and some
strong underlying assumptions. In particular, we assume
that each voter will develop a preference ordering based
only on its own payoffs under each capacity market
proposal. We do not consider the potential for
preference ordering to be influenced by coalition
formation [28-30], nor do we consider any dynamic or
game-theoretic dimensions of these preference
orderings. These assumptions are fairly strong and
limiting, but represent clear opportunities for further
development of these kinds of voting models and
implications of RTO governance structures.
We next categorize three preference types that we
are able to divine from the historical voting data: Clear
preferences that is consistent with our “consumer” or
“supplier” stakeholder model; Abstention for those
stakeholders with two or more abstentions in the voting
data that makes their preference somewhat ambiguous;
and Inconsistent preferences that contains mixed
signals. These “inconsistent” stakeholders voted yes to
both increasing and decreasing clearing price proposals,
or there are too many abstention votes to identify their
preference order.
For the clear preference type, there are two groups
of preference order as described in the previous
paragraph – the consumer group of 48 voters and the
supplier group of 36 voters. The abstentions preference
type also has the consumer and the supplier groups. We
assign the values in the same way as we did for the clear
preference type but only to proposals that voters
specified their preference and leave blanks for proposals
that received abstain vote. For example, two
stakeholders in our data set voted yes to package 1 and
abstained for all the other proposals. In this case, we
assume that the stakeholder’s most preferred option is
package 1 for its preference order and leave blank for
the others. Lastly, for the inconsistent preference type,
we assume that they have random preferences and leave
their preference order entirely blank.

Overall, there are 85 stakeholders in our data set
whose preferences we categorize as clear, 11
stakeholders in our data set whose preferences we
categorize as abstainers and 12 stakeholders whose
preferences we describe as inconsistent.
Blank votes for the abstention and inconsistent
groups are filled in using a Monte Carlo approach.
Stakeholders in the inconsistent group have random
preference orders generated. To generate a complete
preference order for stakeholders in the abstention
group, we first generate a preference ordering among the
yes and no votes, and then randomly complete the
preference order.
Table 4: Examples of modeling ambiguity in
stakeholder preferences
(a)

(b)

VRR Curve
(Ref. Fig. 2)

Actual
Vote

Preference
Order

VRR Curve
(Ref. Fig. 2)

Actual
Vote

Preference Order

Package 1
Package 10
Status Quo
Package 11
Package 12
Package 13

Yes
Abstain
Abstain
Abstain
Abstain
Abstain

Most Preferred
Random
Random
Random
Random
Random

Package 1
Package 10
Status Quo
Package 11
Package 12
Package 13

No
No
Abstain
Abstain
Abstain
Yes

Least Preferred
5th Most Preferred
Random
Random
Random
Most Preferred

Examples of this procedure are shown in Table 4.
Panel (a) shows an actual stakeholder who voted yes
only to Package 1 and abstained for all the others. We
assume that Package 1 is this voter’s most preferred
option, and randomly generate a preference order over
the other five VRR curve options. Panel (b) shows an
actual stakeholder who voted no to Packages 1 and 10,
Yes to Package 13, and abstention to the rest. In this
case, we assume that Packages 1 and 10 are the least
preferred, while Package 13 is the most preferred. The
preference order over the other voting options are
randomly assigned.
For each stakeholder whose preferences fell into the
abstention or inconsistent categories, we generated
1,000 realizations to complete the preference order.

4.2. Simulating Capacity Market Rule
Outcomes
This section provides the results of our voting
outcomes analysis. We model the stakeholder voting
process to choose VRR curve parameters under the
different voting mechanisms described in Section 2.
Recall that when these VRR curve parameters were
voted upon by PJM stakeholders, none of the proposed
alternatives (including the alternative to make no
changes to the VRR curve) were able to pass, and
despite this PJM chose to file with FERC the VRR curve
corresponding to Package 1. We will discuss three sets
of results in this section. The first set of results discusses
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how imposing the NYISO voting structure onto PJM
would change the outcome of the VRR curve voting
process. The second set provides results of imposing a
preferential voting system in PJM, but retaining the PJM
passage threshold of 66.67%. The third set of results
layers the NYISO passage threshold of 58% onto the
preferential voting analysis.
We first describe the results of imposing the NYISO
passage threshold in the PJM stakeholder process. The
modeled voting outcomes are shown in Table 5. When
we impose the NYISO sector-weighted voting structure
onto the PJM stakeholder group, we make a few
assumptions. We first assume that voters’ decisions
would not change under different threshold and sector
weights. We also assume a straightforward translation
of industry sectors in NYISO to those in PJM (see Table
2). For example, we assume voters in the Generation
Owner sector of PJM corresponds to the Generation
Owner sector in NYISO (which has a greater weight
than PJM). We translate the Electric Distributor sector
in PJM to the Public Power sector in NYISO as
previously explained. After changing the threshold to
58% from 66.67% and the sector weights (see table 5),
the results show that all proposals would fail except
Package 13.
Table 5: VRR curve voting outcomes with the
NYISO voting structure

Generation
Owner
Transmission
Owner
Other Supplier
Electric
Distributor
End Use
Customer
Voting Score
and Result

Status
Quo

Package
1

Package
10

Package
11

Package
12

Package
13

0.071

0.833

0.714

0.077

0.231

0.267

0.083

0.8

0.75

0.167

0.167

0.333

0.056

0.667

0.323

0.235

0.25

0.513

0.043

0

0

0.913

0.913

1

0.083

0

0

0.909

1

1

0.067

0.483

0.373

0.437

0.492

0.604

Failed

Failed

Failed

Failed

Failed

Pass

We next describe the results of our voting outcomes
analysis under preferential voting. Because of the
ambiguity of voter preferences in some cases and our
Monte Carlo method of addressing this, we obtain
distributions for voting outcomes rather than a single
outcome (as in Table 5).
We first note that in all of our simulations, Package
13 was the chosen VRR curve alternative for the Instant
Runoff Voting and Coombs models. When these voting
systems are used in PJM, our model suggests a high
level of robustness in the outcome regardless of any
uncertainty over voter preferences.
The Borda Count voting model generated a greater
variety of results, as shown in Table 6. In some cases,
Package 11 or 12 was the winning alternative rather than

Package 13. More than 80% of the time, however,
Package 13 was the winning alternative. This was true
regardless of the level of the passage threshold.
Table 6: VRR voting outcomes under the Borda
Count voting system, with the PJM and NYISO
voting threshold (out of 1,000 simulations)
PJM Threshold
(66.7%)

NYISO Threshold
(58%)

Package 11

2

42

Package 12

112

148

Package 13

886

810

5. Impacts of Voting Structures on
Capacity Market Clearing
As described in [2,4], PJM’s current voting system
has had difficulties in the passage of market rule
changes in contentious issues such as capacity markets.
In Section 4, we found that other voting procedures,
such as a lower passage threshold or preferential voting
would produce a passable voting proposal (we do not
claim that the outcome produced would be good or bad
for the system as a whole, only that the introduction of
preferential voting or a lower passage threshould could
lead to some outcome passing). We noted that the
alternative voting structures that we considered would
have the effect of reinforcing the political power held by
consumer-side interests [2]. In this section we use the
capacity market model developed in Section 3 to
estimate the market impacts of the VRR curves that
alternative voting structures may have passed.
As discussed in Section 5, IRV and Coombs choose
package 13 and Borda count selects among package 11,
12 and 13 with probability of 4%, 15%, and 81%,
respectively. Table 7 combines this information with the
clearing price that our capacity market model suggests
would emerge from each of the proposals. Modeled
market clearing prices from these procedures are lower
than the status quo outcome by around $2.92/MW-day,
and lower than the prices prevailing under Package 1
(which was selected by PJM after stakeholders failed to
pass any of the alternatives) by $4.15/MW-day.
Table 6: Sensitivity of capacity prices to voting
structure
Voting Procedures

Preferential
voting

IRV
Coombs
Borda
Count

Voting
Outcome
Package
Package
Package
Package
Package

13
13
11
12
13

Simulation
results*
PJM
(NYISO)
100%
100%
1% (4%)
11% (15%)
88% (81%)

Clearing Price
($/MW-day)

% changes in
Price compared
to Status quo

% changes in
Price compared
to Package 1

125.93
125.93
128.54
126.42
125.93

-2.30%
-2.30%
-0.28%
-1.92%
-2.30%

-3.61%
-3.61%
-1.61%
-3.23%
-3.61%
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5.1. Sensitivity analysis
This section repeats the capacity market analysis
under two sensitivity analyses that could reasonably
affect capacity prices. The first involves changing the
Cost of New Entry (CONE), which acts as the price cap
in the capacity market. The second involves changing
the supply elasticity at the market-clearing point,
making the supply curve steeper.
Figure 4 summarizes the sensitivity analysis for the
level of the CONE. The x-axis shows market clearing
prices ($/MW-day) and y-axis (left) represents the
likelihood of observing the indicated clearing price or
lower, based on our simulations. Dotted markers
indicate outcomes from IRV or Coombs, and shaded
markers display outcomes of Borda count. The shapes
of the points represent the voting outcome given the
voting procedure and the policy factor variation. Circle
indicates package 13 as a voting result; square
represents package 12; triangle represents package 11;
diamond shape represents the status quo. Our result
shows that policy variations do not change the
probabilities of voting outcome (the right-hand y-axis)
except one type of variation – increase in CONE value
under Borda count. Due to increase in the CONE value,
package 11’s VRR curve becomes higher than that of
the status quo VRR curve. In this case, the status quo
VRR curve is the preferred outcome in a small number
of our trials (4%) instead of Package 11 (0%) while the
chances of Package 12 (14%) and Package 13 (82%) as
a voting outcome remain identical. The picture also
distinguishes variations in CONE values by setting
different colors and line types to each variation. The
blue solid line represents voting outcomes with the
original CONE. Left of the blue line represents
outcomes associated with lower CONE values and those
to the right are associated with higher CONE values.

around $126.25/MW-day which is proposed by package
13; 96 per cent chance that the clearing price would be
around $126.6/MW-day or less, or 15 per cent
incremental chance that the clearing price would be
around $126.6/MW-day which is suggested by package
12; 100 per cent chance that the clearing price would be
$128.2/MW-day or less, or 4 per cent incremental
chance that the clearing price would be $128.2/MW-day
that is what package 11 proposes. In comparison, under
RCV with original policy factors, the clearing price
would be $126.25/MW-day by one hundred per cent
chance.
We also perform a sensitivity analysis on the
elasticity of supply at the market clearing point.. The
price elasticities of supply range from 0.0656 to 0.1656
which shows that the supply in the capacity market is
generally inelastic at the market clearing point. Since at
the clearing price point the price elasticity of the supply
is the lowest (0.0656), we mostly increase the elasticity
to show market prices when other supplies that have
higher price elasticity clear the market. Yet, we still
consider a few cases in which more inelastic supply
offer appear. To change the price elasticity of the supply
at the clearing price point, we shift the supply curve at
and to the right of the market clearing point
(corresponding to shifting points 4, 5 and 6 in Figure 3
by identical percentages).

Figure 5: Sensitivity analysis on the elasticity
of supply.

Figure 4: Sensitivity analysis on the level of the
CONE.
Figure 4 illustrates that without any changes in the
CONE value (original), under Borda count there is about
81 per cent chance that the clearing price would be

Figure 5 illustrates our sensitivity analysis of the
supply price elasticity at the clearing price point. The
curves in Figure 5 correspond to each proposed shape of
the VRR curve. For each proposed VRR curve, Figure 5
shows how the clearing price would change under that
VRR curve for various values of the supply elasticity.
As the price elasticity increases, the difference between
clearing prices of the status quo VRR curve and Package
13 tend to decrease. For example, with the original price
elasticity of supply, 0.0656, the clearing price of the
package 13 is $125.93/MW-day while that of the status
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quo is $128.90/MW-day. If the elasticity increases to
0.0757, the clearing price of Package 13 is
$119.17/MW-day and that of the status quo is
$121.58/MW-day. The difference has decreased from
$2.97/MW-day to $2.41/MW-day and this difference is
smaller when the elasticity is 0.1651, the highest among
our scenarios, which is $0.66/MW-day. The result is
consistent with a geometric interpretation of the supply
and the VRR curve in Figure 2. From point b to point c,
the various VRR curves converge on one another as they
meet at the point c. Therefore, as the supply curve is
getting flatter, or as the price elasticity of the supply
increases, the difference between clearing prices of the
highest VRR curve and the lowest VRR curve would
decrease.

7. Conclusion and Future Work
This study shows how the decision processes for
establishing market rules in RTOs can materially affect
market outcomes and investment incentives. We
develop a modeling approach that can explicitly connect
RTO rule-making decision systems with market
outcomes, and illustrate it using a unique data set related
to a series of capacity market votes.
Under PJM’s current stakeholder voting structure, it
can be difficult to reach an agreement that could be
supported by two-thirds majority for divisive issues. We
found that if PJM were to adopt alternative rules such as
NYISO voting structure or preferential voting system,
such a mechanism would more easily lead to passage of
market rule changes for the capacity market. In the case
that we studied, the outcome that would emerge favors
the interests of consumers, producing lower capacity
prices but also reducing PJM’s installed capacity
margin. Because of the structure of the stakeholder
group in PJM, we believe that the political power
enjoyed by consumer-side interests in our capacity
market case study would extend to other issues, but we
leave more detailed exploration as a matter for further
research.
We do not claim that our modeled outcomes are
better or worse than the actual outcomes that prevailed
in the 2011 capacity market redesign exercise. Our
analysis provides a framework for connecting RTO
governance structures to market outcomes that can be
used to evaluate the market or system impacts of
governance decisions.
Our analysis provides evidence that voting rules can
have a measurable impact on market outcomes which
would affect two-thirds of the U.S. electricity
consumption. While the magnitude of these market
impacts are small in some cases, they are highly
sensitive to other market and policy variables. We
conclude that the impact of RTO governance structures

on market outcomes is not negligible for capacity
investment specifically. Whether this extends to other
market products or elements of power grid operations is
an avenue for potentially fruitful research.
This study also provides a good background to a
comparison analysis across RTOs. Although we do not
directly address difference in governance structures
across RTOs and its consequences–except a passage
threshold comparison with PJM and NYISO–the result
that shows changes in voting outcomes under different
voting rules is sufficient to further develop a research
what these differences mean. We are not arguing that
RTO governing rules have to be the same across
different RTOs. All RTOs have developed their own
rules over time based on countless debate and discussion
that reflect distinct regional characteristics. However,
we see few studies on comparing rule differences even
though it could make non-negligible impact on the
markets.
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